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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to shed light on alternative news media ecosys-
tems that are believed to have influenced opinions and beliefs by
false and/or biased news reporting during the 2016 US Presidential
Elections. We examine a large, professionally curated list of 668
hyper-partisan websites and their corresponding Facebook pages,
and identify key characteristics that mediate the traffic flow within
this ecosystem. We uncover a pattern of new websites being es-
tablished in the run up to the elections, and abandoned after. Such
websites form an ecosystem, creating links from one website to an-
other, and by ‘liking’ each others’ Facebook pages. These practices
are highly effective in directing user traffic internally within the
ecosystem in a highly partisan manner, with right-leaning sites link-
ing to and liking other right-leaning sites and similarly left-leaning
sites linking to other sites on the left, thus forming a filter bubble
amongst news producers similar to the filter bubble which has been
widely observed among consumers of partisan news. Whereas there
is activity along both left- and right-leaning sites, right-leaning
sites are more evolved, accounting for a disproportionate number
of abandoned websites and partisan internal links. We also examine
demographic characteristics of consumers of hyper-partisan news
and find that some of the more populous demographic groups in
the US tend to be consumers of more right-leaning sites.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The rise of the Internet and social media platforms has given a
new dimension to the democratic process. From a political science
perspective, the idea of open participation platforms like blogs and
social media websites have been shown to have high impact in the
democratic process [17] and may well be instrumental in shaping
the elections of the future, as demonstrated by the 2016 US elections.
As such, it is crucial for political and social scientists to assess the
modalities and attitudes towards partisan media, and to understand
their modus-operandi.
So far, research has focused on evaluating the role of social media
and platforms like Reddit and 4chan in the process of sharing
mainstream and alternative news on the web and the lexical value
of the language used by fake-news content [5, 14, 16, 20, 26, 30].
This research has revealed a deep divide between views of the
so-called ‘right’ or ‘conservatives’, and the ‘left’ or ‘liberals’.
This paper attempts to shed first light on hyper-partisan news
websites that have arisen in parallel to this divided social media
discourse. ‘Hyper-partisan’ is a moniker that is believed to originate
from a recent article in the New York Times Magazine [12] and
refers to reporting that departs from traditional notions of journal-
istic balance, and presents a biased picture of one side of a political
debate. In the context of the 2016 US Elections, overt support of the
Democratic (respectively Republican) party or their candidate(s) is
taken to represent a liberal or left-leaning (resp. a conservative, or
right-leaning) bias. We are interested in understanding the produc-
ers of hyper-partisan news, the consumers who visit them, and the
dynamics of how Web traffic is directed towards such sites.
We base our study on an ecosystem of 668 hyper-partisan1 web-
sites and associated Facebook pages shared with us by Buzzfeed
News as part of a recent collaborative investigation connected with
the 2016 US Elections. Building on this dataset2, we collect data
from Alexa.com about the size of the traffic to these sites, from
Facebook about the structure of connections (likes, etc.) between
the different Facebook pages, and from URL shorteners like bit.ly
about the clickthrough rates for short URLs associated with news
stories. Our central approach is to make use of the reliable and
1In the rest of this paper, we interchangeably use the words partisan and hyper-partisan
in connection with websites in this dataset. Operationally, the judgement of whether
a news site is ‘partisan,’ and if so, whether it is right- or left-leaning, was made by
journalists at Buzzfeed News as part of a careful and impartial manual coding process.
This is standard social science practice. Some results in this paper were first reported
as part of our contributions to the Buzzfeed News article [25].
2The dataset we collected is made available at http://bit.ly/partisan-news-data
for non-commercial research usage.
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impartial manual coding of websites into ‘left’ and ‘right’ by our
Buzzfeed collaborators, and use our augmented data to shed light
on partisan behaviour on both sides of the political spectrum.
Our first main finding is that there is a large amount of link-
ing between partisan sites that refer traffic between each other.
These referrals mostly stick to one side of the political debate –
right-leaning websites refer traffic to other right-leaning sites; left-
leaning sites link to left-leaning ones. In other words, among these
producers of hyper-partisan news, we find echo chambers similar
to those which have been widely discussed (e.g., in [7]) among con-
sumers on social media. Unsurprisingly, we find a similar right-left
cliquishness when we study the corresponding Facebook pages
of these news sites, and ask which Page is ‘liked’ by which other
page. Completing the picture, the audiences of the Facebook pages
are similarly divided across right-left lines, which is closer to the
traditional notion of echo chambers in social media.
Next, examining domain ownership records, we find evidence of
a significant boom and decline of hyper-partisan news correspond-
ing with the 2016 US Election cycle – a remarkable number (nearly
one third) of new sites, especially right-leaning ones, were regis-
tered in 2016, during the run-up to the elections. Several are from
Macedonia, providing independent confirmation of the role of Mace-
donian teenagers in propagating false and biased information [27].
Similarly, a disproportionate number of these sites also “die out”
and lose popularity in Alexa Traffic Rankings in the period between
the Nov 2016 elections and President Trump’s inauguration.
This establishment and abandonment of website domains is
stronger amongst right-leaning sites, suggesting that the Amer-
ican Right or Conservative populace was more strongly influenced
by hyper-partisan sites during the election. Complementary to this,
we examine the demographics of the audience of hyper-partisan
sites and find that Americans who visit these hyper- partisan sites
are more right-leaning: Sampled mean demographic audience sizes
for some of the most populous demographic groups of USA (e.g.,
white caucasians, or middle income ranges) are higher for right-
leaning sites.
Collectively, these results shed first light on an ecosystem of web-
sites that affected the 2016 US Elections by presenting a partisan
viewpoint. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. §2 places
our paper in the context of related work. §3 describes the dataset
provided to us by Buzzfeed and our additional data collection ef-
forts with Alexa, bit.ly, and Facebook. §4 examines the websites
studying the characteristics of its owners and the evolution of traf-
fic to these sites. §5 presents a complementary picture, studying
the demographics of the audience of these sites. §6 examines the
producer side filter-bubble caused by the partisan referral of traf-
fic from one website to another of the same political leaning. §7
studies demographics and traffic flows from the perspective of Face-
book pages associated with these sites, finding similar evidence of
internal referrals and increased activity on the right. §8 concludes.
2 RELATEDWORK
We contextualize our work by providing a brief discussion of three
key themes of research in this area. We survey the previous works
which looked at Role of News sources, Role of echo chambers and filter
bubbles and Role of social media in dissemination of fake news. To
this extent our work augments and extends previous literature by
presenting a data-driven analysis of the producers and consumers
of partisan websites, and the traffic forwarding behaviour that
underpins their sustainability and supports on-line echo chambers.
Role of news sources. Classically political and social science
heavily relies on survey-based inferences. There have been impor-
tant studies on partisan news media in the US over the past few
years. These methods help the community get important insights
into the divides in audience attitudes towards media [10] and the
role of social media in news dissemination [9]. However, what they
lack is an understanding of how news websites are shaping these
attitudes and trends, and what role social networks play in facil-
itating the spread of partisan information. A recent data-driven
work [1] provides insights into the role of fake news in US elections.
The authors use interesting sources of data, such as a crowd-driven
website Snopes.com that refutes fake rumors and conspiracy the-
ories. They further find predictors for believability on face news.
Their study is highly selective towards the fake news phenomenon,
and ignores the effect of online news sources (such as Breitbart,
Infowars, ThinkProgress, OccupyDemocrats) that promote partisan
content which may not necessarily be fake. We find in our study
that these sources have big enough presence to shape traffic and
grab click-through rates as high as 4% on their posts. Karamshuk
et al. [15] showed quantitative evidence for biased reporting in
news and social media across national divides in the context of the
recent conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Our work in contrast
applies to ideological divides within a nation, and during a national
election rather than a conflict situation.
Role of echo chambers and filter bubbles. Echo chambers re-
fer to the phenomenon when people do not subscribe to views
that do not agree with their own. Coupled with recommendation
system algorithms, a self-reinforcing ecosystem emerges where
users get fed information that suits their opinions [6]. Pariser [23]
argues that the ubiquitous nature of technology that personalizes
every search and every interaction has created this “In the Loop”
process. This has inspired a series of works on recommendation
systems for Facebook users that have revealed both the presence
of filter bubbles and awareness among some users about their exis-
tence [24]. Recent work for probable remedies [7] explores breaking
the polarized echo chambers by exposing users to opposing sides
of discourse. Our work can help such fledgling efforts by helping
shed light on the nature of the divide between different viewpoints.
Role of social media in dissemination of fake news. The
issue of fake news and conspiracies has received considerable
attention since the 2016 US Presidential election. Various stud-
ies [5, 14, 16, 20, 30] have explored the role of social media and
platforms like Reddit and 4chan in the process of sharing main-
stream and alternative news on the web—but these focus on the
lexical value of the language used by fake-news content. Starbird et.
al [26] explore the alternative media domain networks by analyzing
58M total tweets related to mass shooting events for a period of
about 10 months beginning in January 2016, and provide a qualita-
tive analysis of how alternative news sites propagate and promote
false narratives while mainstream media refrains from such be-
haviour. They show the presence of domain clusters that control
the flow of information with the alternative news ecosystem and
their political polarization. As the scope of this work is limited
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to the Twitter activity of influential alternative news websites, it
does not capture the referer traffic patterns between social network
pages or the actual web pages. Our work complements the findings
of this paper using other modalities of data and other datasets.
3 DATASET DESCRIPTION
Our primary dataset comprises of a curated list of partisan web-
sites and associated Facebook pages, augmented with traffic and
audience engagement information using third party websites and
APIs like Alexa3 and Facebook Graph API4.
3.1 Buzzfeed Dataset
Asmentioned previously, Buzzfeed News provided us with a dataset
which was collected and curated by them in the context of an in-
vestigation into partisan news in the 2016 US Presidential Elections.
This dataset consists of two main parts: a list of 668 websites which
were classified by them as partisan, and a list of Facebook pages
which are associated with these websites.
3.1.1 Partisan websites dataset. The Buzzfeed data set contains
of a list of 668 unique partisan sites, of which 489 were classified as
left-leaning and 179 as right-leaning after a careful manual exami-
nation by two journalists from Buzzfeed News. These 668 websites
form the basis of the rest of our study, and we take as ground truth
the journalists’ professionally informed categorisation of the web-
sites into ‘left’ and ‘right’. In addition, the following key attributes
were collected about each site: registration date, Facebook Id, owner
firstname, lastname and company, political category, Google ana-
lytics and Google Adsense codes
3.1.2 Facebook. Facebook has become an important platform
for communications. Many news organisations, including virtually
all major mainstream newspapers maintain associated Facebook
pages. The Facebook page for each website in our dataset was iden-
tified using either direct links from the website itself, or using the
CrowdTangle browser plugin to identify Facebook pages which
share all the content from the corresponding website. 507 of the
668 websites have public Facebook pages that could be program-
matically accessed. For each accessible Facebook page, the dataset
contains engagement information of each post— status id, status
message, status link, status type, timestamp when the post was
published, no. of reactions, no. of comments and no. of shares of
4M posts between January 1st, 2015 and March 31st, 2017. Table 1
provides an overview of the Buzzfeed Facebook dataset.
Metric Total Average
# Fans 326M 0.67M
# Posts 4.1M 8514
# Post Reactions 0.59M 1163
# Post Comments 66924 132
# Post Shares 0.3M 605
Table 1: Buzzfeed Facebook Dataset Overview
3https://www.alexa.com/about
4https://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api/
3.1.3 On the Quality and Completeness of the Buzzfeed Data.
To our knowledge, this dataset represents one of the most compre-
hensive lists of partisan news websites associated with the 2016
US elections. Buzzfeed’s article [25] publishes full details about the
process used to curate this data. In summary, Buzzfeed curated
the list using two journalists who were dedicated to identifying
partisan news. Websites were added based on the criterion that
“they are clear about their political views and alignment and/or
are explicitly ideological in their identity”. Although it is hard to
include every eligible website (for many reasons, e.g., new ones are
constantly created, and others lose traffic, as discussed in §4), an
effort was made to ensure that the dataset is reasonably complete.
After collecting a seed set of 500 sites, the journalists identified
other links on the home pages of these publications to further ex-
pand the dataset. In addition, the authors of this paper leveraged
Alexa traffic referral data (3.2.1), and compiled a list of 78 potential
websites that are among the top 5 referers of traffic to the websites
in the dataset. This list was passed to our collaborators in Buzzfeed
News. After a manual examination by them, only 8 of the 78 were
deemed as important (and added to the list of partisan Websites),
which provides an indirect indication of the completeness of the
original list.
Altogether, this process identified 668 Websites which form our
base dataset. Each website in the final list was classified by the
Buzzfeed journalists as ‘left’ or ‘right’ based on self identification
on the website or its associated page, or if an overt ideological
preference could be deduced by manual examination. The rest of
our analysis relies on the manual coding of sites into ‘left’ and
’right’ by the two professional journalists. While there are many
more right-leaning sites than left-leaning ones, we believe that this
is due to difference in hyper-partisan activity between the two sides
of the political spectrum. Where relevant to the result, we take care
to adjust for this imbalance in the dataset.
3.2 Augmented Dataset
We augmented the data provided by Buzzfeed News by collecting
information from a diverse set of data sources that can shed light on
the traffic and other engagement metrics of the partisan websites
and their Facebook pages. This included using AlexaWeb Analytics,
gathering engagement counts and other metrics from Facebook,
examining short URLs to determine click through rates.
3.2.1 Alexa. Alexa is an internet portal which provides web
analytics including website traffic statistics, site comparisons, and
website audience. Alexa’s measurement panel is based on a diverse
set of over 25,000 browser extensions and plug-ins used by millions
of people [21]. Alexa does not reveal the full methodology it uses
to collect data, but notes that the current implementation extends
beyond the common understanding that it is based on a single
popular browser toolbar [21].
Although Alexa’s data collection methodology may lead to some
biases, it is believed to be the best available option for demographic
and traffic information on the Web [28]. Alexa provides a basic
notion of reliability by filtering data and only reporting statistics
about a website when it believes that the website has sufficient
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measurable traffic available5. Our choice of using Alexa is based
on these factors.
To gain further insights about the traffic flow patterns of the
partisan sites, we crawled several metrics fromAlexa between June–
July 2017 for the websites. The main metrics gathered were the
current traffic rankings, the variation in traffic rank for the past
one year (this is available as a chart; we crawled and converted this
into actual ranks), top-5 upstream sites (sites which the users visit
before visiting the site in question), and audience demographics,
such as the distributions of age ranges, ethnicity, gender, education
and income levels of the visitors to each site.
According to Alexa, the rank data is derived from the traffic data
provided by the users in Alexa’s Global Data Panel over a rolling
3 month period and is based on the browsing pattern of people
in Alexa’s Global Data Panel6. Alexa says that the “audience de-
mographics data comes from voluntary demographics information
submitted by people in our global traffic panel. The data is for the
past 12 months, updated monthly.”. Table 2 provides details about
the number of sites for which Alexa was able to provide statistically
relevant numbers for each metric.
Alexa Metric Size (no. of sites)
Top-5 upstream sites 484
Ranks 570
Rank charts 586
Audience Demographics 421
Table 2: Statistics of the collected Alexa dataset
3.2.2 Facebook. We augmented the Facebook dataset by collect-
ing page metrics for each of the 507 Facebook pages using Face-
book’s Graph API. The following metrics were collectedcategory,
fan_count, start_type, start_date, pages that follow these pages of
the pages, websites associated with the pages and their verifica-
tion_status. We also collected random samples of 1000 active user
followers for top 100 most popular partisan pages.
3.2.3 Click counts from Short URLs. Through some initial explo-
ration of the Buzzfeed Facebook dataset we discovered that about
6% of the 4M Facebook posts were short URLs that mostly linked
back to the article on the website. In order to study the relationship
between their click through rates and Facebook post engagement,
we collected the cumulative clicks count data for a sample com-
prising of 25000 Bit.ly short URLs across 216 pages using the Bitly
API.
4 PRODUCERS OF PARTISAN NEWS
Wefirst look at the websites, by examining domain registrations.We
look at who the owners are and when the websites were registered,
relative to the US elections. We find several owners who run groups
(i.e., more than one) of partisan websites. We also identify a number
of websites which appear to have been created specifically for the
US elections, registered in the run up to the elections, and then
losing popularity immediately after.
Who are the owners. We begin by asking who are the owners of
these websites, using the ownership records of the website domain
5https://support.alexa.com/hc/en-us/articles/200449744
6https://support.alexa.com/hc/en-us/articles/200449744-How-are-Alexa-s-traffic-
rankings-determined
names as returned by WHOIS7 queries. We find that 78 of the
668 partisan sites (i.e., 11%) in our list are run by Macedonian
owners, further confirming the story of the macedonian teens and
young men who ran successful partisan websites [27]. These are
mostly conservative sites (74 of these 78 are right-leaning, 4 are
left-leaning). Additionally, we discovered that at least 12 U.S. based
firms manage multiple websites and associated Facebook pages as
listed in table 3.
Owner Companies No. of websites owned
Discount Book Distributors 22 right
Addicting Info 8 left
DB Capitol Strategies 6 right
Today’s Growth Consultant 5 right & 1 left
Salem Media Group 5 right
Power Publisher 4 right
Media Research Center 4 right
Liftable Media 3 right
News Corpse 3 left
Counter Punch 2 left
Table 3: Top 10 companies by no. of partisan sites owned
Largely, we observe that most of the owner companies have
overt political affiliations i.e. they either handle collections of con-
servative or liberal sites. One prominent exception to this is To-
day’s Growth Consultant that runs 5 conservative sites including
My Right America and Red White and Right along with Progressive
Liberal which is a left leaning site. Such bipartisan ownership of
partisan websites suggests that the motive behind running collec-
tions of partisan sites cannot solely be attributed to propaganda but
might also include financial incentives (e.g., advertising revenue).
Birth and death of partisan websites. Next, we analyse the
role played by the US election timeline on the production of partisan
content. We map the birth of these websites by using the date of
the domain name registrations (Figure. 1). 188 of the 668 websites –
nearly a third – were registered in the election year of 2016, making
it the year with the most number of domain name registrations for
the sites in our dataset.
Figure 1: Domain registration dates of partisan websites
Among these 188websites, 81% support conservative viewswhile
19% are liberal, pointing to an increased activity of partisan news on
the conservative side. Note that this activity is disproportionately
7The WHOIS protocol, as specified in RFC 3912 is a way to look up owners of Web
domain names. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
provides a WHOIS primer with more details at https://whois.icann.org/en/about-whois
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large considering that about 73% of the sites in our overall dataset
are conservative.
Then we study the ‘death’ or loss of traffic for these websites.
We do this by acquiring the longitudinal Alexa rank numbers for
the websites spanning across the period of one year.
Figure 2: Point of decline in popularity of partisan websites.
The distribution of the date of peak popularity of individual
websites is shown. From this point on, the traffic rank of the
sites have been in overall decline (measured until June 29,
2017)
Figure 2 provides the distribution of the time of peak Alexa rank
(or equivalently, peak traffic) for the partisan sites. About 31% of the
left-leaning and 40% of the right-leaning sites had highest individual
Alexa Ranks between Nov 2016 (when the election took place) to
Feb 2017 (date when Trump moved into the White House). Again,
we note that a disproportionately large number of conservative
websites peaked and declined in popularity after this period.
These results indicate that the traffic to these hyper-partisan sites
is co-incident with the US elections. There could be several possi-
ble explanations. For instance, it may be that some websites were
run by foreign actors or other agents with an explicit interest in
promoting partisan news during the US elections, but stopped pro-
moting their sites after the elections as it was no longer necessary.
A second possibility is that the website owners were financially mo-
tivated and the sites were no longer as valuable after the elections.
Alternately, the consumers of this content were more interested
during the closely fought elections and lost interest afterwards. Our
data can only observe the correlation of the website registrations
and peak popularity with the election cycle, and cannot distinguish
between these different possibilities.
5 CONSUMERS OF PARTISAN NEWS
Having considered the producers, we next seek to understand who
are the consumers. To this end, we analyzed demographics data for
partisanwebsites collected using the Alexa API, which also provides
information about how the reported statistics compare with the
general Internet population. We were able to collect demographics
data for 63% (421/668) of the partisan websites8, of which 69%
(290/421) are right-leaning and the remaining 31% (131/421) are
8Alexa does not have enough data about the remaining 247 sites. This may partly be
explainable by the fact that 114 of the 247 sites were only launched in 2016/17.
left-leaning. Because of the differences in the numbers between the
left and the right, we take demographic scores for the left and the
right by sampling equal numbers of sites, and report the mean of
this sample.
Range Audience Representation
0–50 Greatly under-represented
50–90 Under-represented
90–110 Similar to the general Internet
population
110–200 Over-represented
200–Infinity Greatly over-represented
Table 4: Audience Demographics Scale (from Alexa.com)
We focused our analysis on five aspects of demographics namely
age, education, ethnicity, income and gender. We visualize these
patterns through a series of bar plots. The X axis represents the
demographic bracket and the Y axis the sampled mean audience
count (normalized to 100 for the general Internet population, as
shown in Table 4) across all the left- or right- leaning websites. All
bar plots are shown with standard error.
As expected from other surveys [19] that suggests younger peo-
ple are less politically engaged, Figure 3a shows that those aged
45 and younger are under-represented relative to the rest of the
Internet population, and those above 45 over-represented. Interest-
ingly, the under-represented populations are nearly equally left-
and right-leaning, but the difference between left and right also
grows with age. Partisan news consumers amongst the young (25 to
34) and the oldest (65+) age groups tend to be more liberal, while the
middle-aged and older consumers (45 to 64) are more conservatively
inclined. These findings are generally in line with conventional
wisdom [13] and think tanks according to which older people tend
to be more conservative than their younger counterparts.
However, among the 65+ age group that show maximum en-
gagement in partisan news, there are relatively more liberal than
conservative consumers. This could potentially be explained by
the “tree ring” hypothesis, which contends that reaching young
adulthood during certain historical periods has an effect on lifelong
attitudes. In particular, increased liberalism among Americans who
reached young adulthood (defined as age 16) in the 1960s (and are
therefore currently 65+) has been confirmed with evidence from
the General Social Survey [4].
Figure 3b shows that people with no college education do not
engage much with partisan news. Those with the most common ed-
ucational attainment level (some college) have significantly higher
affinity with right-leaning sites than left-leaning ones. On the other
hand, people with a higher educational background (those who
have completed a college or graduate degree) are active consumers
of partisan websites, and tend to be left-inclined. We also notice
that people with very high levels of education (Graduate School)
are less represented than those with some college [18].
As expected from the SocioEconomic Status theory [29], Fig-
ure 3c indicates that people from economically weaker backgrounds
do not tend to participate politcally and are overall less represented
(i.e., have lower demographic scores) on partisan websites. We ob-
serve that people in the $30-60k and $100k+ income brackets are
over-represented with nearly equal distributions of left-leaning and
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 3: Demographic insights into audience of partisan websites, shown as bar plots with standard error. X-axis shows de-
mographic bracket; Y axis shows sampled mean demographic score, using the scale in Table 4. Horizontal bands are drawn
to indicate demographic scores in the range 90–110, which is considered to be representative of the general Internet popula-
tion (Table 4). 3a: Age Fig.3b: Education ,3c: Income. 3d: ethnicity. The ethnicities are coded as AF: African, AF/AM: African-
American, AS: Asian, CU: Caucasian, HS: Hispanic, ME: Middle Eastern and finally Others.
right-leaning readership. However, the upper middle-class audi-
ence (with income in the range $60-100k) is more inclined towards
conservative news. This is the most common income range in the
USA and includes roughly 1 in 3 households in the USA9.
Figure 3d shows the racial distribution of consumers of parti-
san websites. Caucasians represent an overwhelming majority of
consumers as expected. Caucasian, Hispanic and Other audience
is somewhat equally divided between left-wing and right-wing.
African-Americans are found to be more left-leaning. We note
that African, Asian, and Middle Eastern communities are under-
represented for partisan websites in comparison with the rest of the
Internet population; thus the audience for hyper partisan websites
appears to be white caucasians.
We also note (no figure included) that females are underrepre-
sented amongst visitors to our list of partisan websites, and those
that follow such websites are more left-leaning. We conjecture this
is due to Hilary Clinton becoming the first female candidate to
be nominated for president by a major U.S. political party (The
Democrats). Male readers are over-represented for both conserva-
tive and liberal websites, but there is a higher inclination towards
conservative news. The increased male support for conservative
positions and candidates has been observed in several places (e.g.,
The Guardian [2] and Washington Post [8]) and the results also
resonate with several surveys (e.g., Pew Internet Research [3]).
In summary, the demographics study identifies an increased rep-
resentation of conservative-leaning audiences in the most common
demographic categories for education, income and ethnicity. Fur-
thermore, many of the more engaged (i.e., demographic score > 110)
age ranges also tend to be right leaning. The only highly engaged
demographic group which is left leaning is the 65+ age range (≈
15% of the US population).
6 PARTISAN TRAFFIC FLOWS
Since the Random Surfer model was introduced in the PageR-
ank [22] paper, it has been understood that sites can become impor-
tant if other important sites refer to them. In this section, we use
this concept to understand how the partisan websites gather traffic.
9http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2012/07/16/156688596/what-americans-earn
Using Alexa data, we obtain and analyse the list of upstream refer-
ers10 to the partisan websites in our dataset, finding strong evidence
of partisan echo chambers of right- and left-leaning websites.
6.1 Drivers of traffic to partisan websites
According to Alexa, upstream sites are sites that the visitors of a
website visit immediately before visiting it. These are obtained using
a diverse range of browser extensions and plugins from Alexa’s
measurement panel. Depending on availability of statistics, Alexa
lists up to 5 top upstream referers to each website. We use Alexa’s
list to understand who drives traffic to the partisan sites dataset.
Upstream data is available for 484 of the 668 partisan websites. Of
these, 70% (339) are right leaning, and 30% (145) are left leaning.
As a baseline, we also examine the distribution of upstream traf-
fic referers for a list of top 500 news websites ranked by Alexa11.
These are mainstream media sites – large news conglomerates that
influence a vast readership and whose political news coverage is
not formally announced to be in alignment with a specific polit-
ical category or ideology, and include websites such as cnn.com,
nytimes.com, theguardian.com, washingtonpost.com, etc. For each
mainstream website, we collected upstream site information from
Alexa, and were able to get data for 478 websites.
Category Description Examples
Search Search engines Google, Yahoo, Bing
Social Social media sites Facebook, Twitter
YouTube Video-streaming YouTube
Internal Partisan sites Infowars, Breitbart
External Other sites New York Times,
Huffington Post
Table 5: Categories of upstream sites
We divide the upstream referers into five broad categories as
described in Table 5. As with many other websites, search engines
and social networks such as Facebook are the main referers, apart
from YouTube, which contributes a small but significant minority.
The remaining two categories are ‘internal’ and ‘external’.We define
10We use the spelling ‘referers’ [sic] following the original misspelling in the HTTP
Referer header [11, pg 524].
11https://www.alexa.com/topsites/category/News
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Figure 4: Distribution of Partisan and Mainstream referers
internal upstream referers as other sites within the same category.
Thus, the internal referers for partisan websites are other partisan
websites; internal referers for mainstream news websites are other
mainstream news websites. The external category captures all sites
which are not otherwise categorised (i.e., all non-internal, non-
social and non search-engine and non YouTube websites).
Figure 4 shows that social networks and search engines are the
top drivers of traffic to both partisan as well as mainstream news
websites. However, partisan websites have a disproportionately
large amount of internal referrals. The Internal category consisting
of 14.7% of partisan upstream sites that drive traffic among them-
selves together form the 3rd largest source of traffic to partisan
sites as shown in Figure 4. The share of traffic from the internal
linkage between partisan websites is higher than many traditional
drivers of internet traffic such as Twitter (9.3%) and YouTube (9%).
We find this trend to be consistent for both left- and right-leaning
websites (right-left split not shown in figure).
Moreover, the share of internal upstream referers is 1.6 times
higher in partisan websites than mainstream news sites. In terms
of individual numbers, nearly half (46%) of the unique upstream
sites to partisan websites are internal, in contrast to the case of
mainstream websites where only 23% of upstream sites are internal.
These evidences point to an echo chamber of sorts amongst partisan
websites which are driving traffic amongst each other, which we
investigate further.
6.2 Echo chambers among partisan producers
We previously observed in Figure 4 that internal referers are a sig-
nificant driver of traffic to partisan websites. We further break down
such referring by political inclinations of the partisan websites to
illuminate traffic flows among left and right websites. To test if
we see any peculiar internal linking among left- and right-leaning
websites we plotted the instances where a left-leaning partisan site
links to a left-leaning site, and right-leaning one links to another
right-leaning site. We also look at sites that link across the partisaan
divide (i.e., a right-leaning site linking to a left-leaning website and
vice versa).
Figure 5 shows that internal referrals are clearly split along party
lines—there is a very significant amount of internal referrals within
the right as well as within the left but very little referrals from left
to right or right to left. Indeed, there are 208 instances of a right
partisan website being a top-5 referer to another right partisan
Figure 5: Internal referrals within and across partisan divide
website, and 59 instances of a left partisan website being a top-
5 referer to another left partisan website, in comparison to the
single digit number of instances where a left site is a top-5 referer
for a right-leaning site or vice versa. In total, partisan referrals
between right-right or left-left account for 267/273 internal traffic
referrals, i.e., ≈98% of referrals between websites in our dataset
happen within their own biased part of the political spectrum.
Internal referrals appear to be more prevalent on the right: As
mentioned in §6.1, upstream traffic data is available for 339 (145)
sites on the right (left). Of these, 139 (46) right (left) sites receive
internal referrals according to Figure 5. In other words, 41% of sites
on the right benefit from receiving internal referrals as opposed
to 31.7% of sites on the left—internal referrals are 1.3 times more
prevalent on the right than on the left.
This result highlights the existence of echo chambers among
partisan websites in general, and conservative websites in partic-
ular. Such referral structures might serve to further reinforce and
promote partisan micro-cultures.
Figure 6: Partisan Sites Network Graph: Edges are drawn
from site A to site B if A is one of the top 5 referers of traffic
to B. In-degree is therefore capped at 5. Node size is propor-
tional to out-degree, and large nodes are highly influential
in directing traffic to other nodes.
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6.3 Network of partisan links
To discover the most influential partisan domains we modelled
the partisan sites as a network where an edge is drawn from one
website A to another website B if A is a top-5 referer of B. Thus,
we obtain a graph with a maximum in-degree of 5. We draw this
graph in Figure 6, with right (left) leaning sites coloured as red
(blue), and the size of the labels is proportional to the out-degree
of the node, i.e., the size of a node A is proportional to the number
of other sites on whose top-5 referer lists A appears. This figure
clearly visualises the separation between right and left leaning sites.
This is confirmed by running the Louvain method for community
detection, which achieves a modularity value of 0.69, indicative of
an extremely strong community structure, with dense links within
nodes in the same community and few links across communities.
We next move to identify the important players that send traffic
to other sites, as the nodes with the largest number of outgoing
edges, and the important beneficiaries as the nodes with the largest
number of incoming internal edges. Table 6 lists the top 10 partisan
sites with the largest outgoing and incoming links. Considering the
ratio of right to left sites in our dataset (§3), we expect right-leaning
sites to comprise ≈ 70% of the lists. While we see the expected num-
ber of left-leaning sites amongst the sites with the most incoming
links, the preponderance of right-leaning sites in the list of sites
with the most outgoing links suggests the right has a monopoly on
forward traffic referrals.
Top out-degree Top in-degree
Drudge Report (R) Blue Tribune (L)
Conservative Tribune (R) Powerline Blog (R)
Occupydemocrats (L) My Right America (R)
Fox News (R) Raw Progressive (L)
Young Cons (R) Hillary Daily (R)
Freedom Daily (R) Hot Air (R)
Breitbart (R) Die Hard Democrat (L)
Red State Watcher (R) Conservative101 (R)
Pj Media (R) Red White and Right (R)
Conservative Fighters
(R)
Rush Limbaugh (R)
Table 6: Top-10 websites by highest out-(in-) degree. Right-
(Left-)leaning websites are marked as R (L).
7 PARTISAN FACEBOOK COMMUNITIES
Many of the partisan websites in our dataset also have correspond-
ing Facebook pages, with some of them having millions of follow-
ers. The social features of Facebook pages allows us to provide a
more complete, yet different picture of the hyper-partisan news
ecosystem: Rather than having to infer traffic referrals from Alexa
summaries, we can identify which pages ‘like’ which other page.
Users who interact through comments and likes on Facebook pages
can be identified, allowing us to directly examine the consumers
of hyper partisan content. Short URLs such as bit.ly links are used
on some Facebook pages. By tracking these links, we can identify
engagement beyond comments and likes to measure click-through
rates. Together, these studies paint a picture of the consumers of
hyper partisan news as highly engaged but separated communities.
7.1 Partisan page endorsements
Figure 7: Graph induced from Facebook pages of partisan
websites. Edges are drawn from page A to page B if page A
‘likes’ B. Node sizes are proportional to the in-degree.
Our investigation of upstream sites and their internal traffic
forwarding patterns showed a highly polarized structure of the
partisan news web. However, this traffic referral had to be inferred
through Alexa data, and the study was limited by the fact that
only the top-5 referers were available through Alexa. By contrast,
Facebook pages can explicitly ‘like’ other pages, which allows us
to infer the links between different partisan entities directly.
Since many of the partisan websites we examine also have official
Facebook pages, we crawl these using the Facebook Graph API, and
also crawl the pages liked by these partisan pages. We then build a
graph of relationships between these pages, assigning directed links
from Page A to Page B if Page A likes Page B. Nodes are coloured
red or blue according to whether they are right or left leaning. The
resulting graph is shown in the Fig 7. As with Fig. 5, this graph
shows a clear community structure with a high modularity value
of 0.46. The node labels are drawn proportional to the in-degree,
i.e., the label of a page X is proportional to the number of pages
which like page X.
7.2 Echo Chambers among Facebook Users
To understand user engagement with these pages, we focus on the
top 10 pages on the left and right with the most number of followers.
In each page, we then identify 100 posts with the highest number
of reactions. In this manner, we create a corpus of 10 ∗ 100 = 1000
posts on the left, and a similar number on the right. For each post,
we identify up to 1000 users (API limit) who have liked the post.
Thus, we identify up to 1000 ∗ 100 = 100, 000 users who have liked
posts on each Facebook page.
With this data, we ask what is the overlap between the left and
the right. We randomly pick k = 2 pages on the left and right
respectively. We then take the set of users who have interacted
with the top 100 posts on the k = 2 pages on the left and the set of
users who have interacted with the top 100 posts on each of the
k = 2 pages on the right, and compute their intersection, finding the
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number of users who are common. We may similarly compute the
left-left and right-right overlap, finding users who have interacted
with k = 2 pages on the left (right). This process can be repeated
for k = 2, 3, 4 . . . 10. Note that for any given k , the number of pages
involved in a left-left or right-right interaction is k , whereas the
number of pages involved in a left-right interaction is 2k , thus
offering more opportunity for users to interact.
Figure. 8 shows the result of computing the overlap between
pages using this process. As k increases, the number of users who
are common across all k sites drops, and the values become too
small to report after k = 4. We also observe a left-left and right-
right bias, wherein there is significantly more overlap of users who
interact with pages all from the left or all from the right, than with
pages from both the left and the right. While it is expected that
the number of users who interact with k different pages drops as k
increases, the significant difference between left-left and right-right
interactions on the one hand and left-right interactions on the other
hand again points to a hyper partisan audience, similar to the hyper
partisan links found between producers.
Figure 8: Overlaps of users amongst K random pages from either sides
7.3 Characterising Facebook Page Engagement
Figure 9: CDF of reactions on Facebook page and click
through of bit.ly URL posts
The 4 Million posts that we obtained by crawling across 507 par-
tisan pages, fall into three distinct categories. They are embedded
URLs (84.5%), photos (11%) and videos (3.7%). We also find that 6%
of the embedded URLs are shortened URLs, shortened by services
like bit.ly or goo.gl. Tea Party, ClashDaily.com with Doug Giles
and American Thinker are the top 3 pages with maximum number
of short-urls (> 15, 000 each). Finding bit.ly shortened URLs al-
lowed us to track the click through rates of these shortened URLs
using the bit.lyAPI. In order to understand whether the Facebook
users actually engage and if they do click through short URLs such
as bit.ly, we crawled the clicks data for about 25 thousand short
URLs belonging to 216 pages. The Fig. 9 shows the CDF of reactions
on a facebook post with an embedded URL, and the click through
for these URLs. Interestingly we note that click through is much
higher than reactions on facebook. Also we found that the two
variables are positively correlated (R = 0.26, p « 10−6). Moreover
after normalising the clicks per subscriber by calculating
mean( Clicks for a URL
Subscribers of the host page
)
across all partisan pages, we see a click through ratio of 4%. This rate
is, according to some sources12, much higher than many marketing
returns for ad campaigns. These insights show that Facebook pages
are not only promoting the echo chambers of partisanship, but are
also effective in accruing clicks for these sources.
8 CONCLUSION
Hyper-partisan news media has been proven to be a major compo-
nent in fake news proliferation13. In this study, we used a journalist-
curated set of 668 hyper-partisan websites related to US News, and
their associated Facebook pages, to characterise in depth the web-
sites that produce hyper-partisan content, and the consumers of
this content. We also answered two questions which have not been
examined until now: how does traffic get directed towards partisan
websites, and how do users engage with these websites.
It was found that many of the websites, especially right-wing
ones, were set up in 2016 during the run up to the US elections, and
their Alexa traffic ranks declined after the Trump elections. This
quick birth and death process casts some doubt on the role of these
sites as purveyors of ‘news’ – rather they appear to be makeshift
platforms for distributing content when it was important to do so,
or when there was a willing audience with an appetite for partisan
politics. Our data-driven approach can only uncover the correlation
of these websites’ lifetimes with the US election. Pinning down the
cause for this would be an interesting avenue for future research.
We analysed the demographics of the audience of partisan web-
sites, and observed an increased propensity for conservatism amongst
the most populous demographic groups (e.g., Caucasians, middle in-
come group, and average educational attainment), which points to
increased interest in and potentially support for right wing causes.
Analysis of traffic patterns over these partisan sites helped us un-
cover tightly interlinked communities of a partisan nature, which
also showed evidence of echo chambers among producers of news,
similar to ones observed amongst consumers previously.
Overall, this study revealed that the way traffic, information and
users are forwarded amongst hyperpartisan sites might be aiding, or
worse, widening the highly polar nature of newsmedia. Our study is
not without limitations: As mentioned, a data-driven study such as
this cannot uncover causal relationships. The dataset itself has been
curated carefully, and to our knowledge, is the largest list of partisan
12http://mashable.com/2009/07/07/twitter-clickthrough-rate/
13https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/upshot/the-real-story-about-fake-news-is-
partisanship.html
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websites. However, our conclusions may not generalise beyond
those sites active in the 2016 US Elections, or to partisan sites in
other geographies. Finally, although Alexa provides several hints
and reassurances about the quality of data (see text and footnotes
earlier), it does not fully reveal the methodology it uses, which
makes it harder to understand the true potential or limitations of
some of our results which rely on this data.
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